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Abstract: The problem of replay attacks in the communication network between Distributed
Generation Units (DGUs) of a DC microgrid is examined. The DGUs are regulated through
a hierarchical control architecture, and are networked to achieve secondary control objectives.
Following analysis of the detectability of replay attacks by a distributed monitoring scheme
previously proposed, the need for a watermarking signal is identified. Hence, conditions are
given on the watermark in order to guarantee detection of replay attacks, and such a signal is
designed. Simulations are then presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the technique.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation and state of the art
The interest in islanded microgrids has spiked over the
past few years, following the increased penetration of re-
newable energy sources within the electrical network as
they can offer benefits compared to traditional grids, such
as improving reliability, help avoiding overload problems,
and allowing local power quality regulation, among others
(Meng et al., 2017b). Specifically, as many of the adopted
generation, storage, and end-user equipment are based on
DC technology, DC microgrids (DCmGs) have attracted a
lot of research activity, as can be seen from the recent sur-
vey (Meng et al., 2017b). In order to guarantee the stable
and efficient behavior of the microgrid, hierarchical control
architectures have been proposed (Guerrero et al., 2009),
in which a decentralized primary layer ensures voltage,
current and power stability (Tucci et al., 2016; Zhao and
Do¨rfler, 2015), and secondary and tertiary control layers,
then, offer additional properties, such as power quality
regulation, load sharing, and ensuring overall coordination
and optimization (De Persis et al., 2016; Tucci et al.,
2017; Zhao and Do¨rfler, 2015). It has been shown that, in
order to achieve some of the objectives, the secondary and
tertiary controllers require the support of a communication
network between Distributed Generation Units (DGUs)
(Meng et al., 2017a; Cavraro et al., 2016).
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The integration of communication networks within con-
trol systems has exposed them to the possibility of being
tampered by malicious agents, injecting false information
within the control loop, thus altering their behavior (Car-
denas et al., 2008; Cheng et al., 2017). Given the possibility
of attacks, it has been recognized as necessary to intro-
duce monitoring structures capable of evaluating whether
operations are running as normal or not (see papers in
(Sandberg et al., 2015; Cheng et al., 2017)).
Among several types of attacks, during replay attacks an
attacker is able to record data transmitted over a com-
munication network, and then replay it, replacing actual
communication signals with buffered data. This class of
attacks has been shown to be particularly difficult to de-
tect for common monitoring schemes, as they present the
same statistics as the nominal behavior (Mo et al., 2015).
Several techniques have been proposed in order to detect
this class of attack, often by altering the characteristics of
the system through the addition of a watermark (Mo et al.,
2015; Ferrari and Teixeira, 2017). These methods borrow
the idea of watermarking from the multimedia industry
(Hartung and Kutter, 1999). where data is embedded
in order to prevent unauthorized reproduction of media
content. In (Mo et al., 2015), a time-varying watermark is
added to the input signal of a system, in order to alter the
characteristic statistics of the steady state, thus allowing
the monitoring scheme to detect the presence of an attack.
In (Ferrari and Teixeira, 2017), the watermark signal is
added directly to the sensor measurements communicated
to the monitoring scheme and controller. Other techniques
have been proposed to counteract stealthy data injection
attacks. For example in (Miao et al., 2017), the proposed
strategy encodes the sensor measurements through a ”cod-
ing matrix”, assumed to be unknown by the attacker, in
order to prevent stealthy data injection.
All of the methods proposed to detect replay attacks rely
on the possibility of implementing the monitoring scheme
centrally. This, however, is not desirable for DCmGs, as
all distributed generation units (DGUs) would need to
communicate with a central point, which would increase
the communication cost. In this preliminary work, we
propose a distributed watermarking technique for the
monitoring of microgrids.
Recently, a few works have examined attacks on micro-
grids, although not considering replay attacks. The sus-
ceptibility of the secondary control objectives to jamming
attacks on the communication between DGUs is shown
in (Danzi et al., 2016), while in (Gallo et al., 2018) we
have proposed a distributed monitoring scheme to detect
the presence of attackers in the communication network,
developed off the preliminary work in (Boem et al., 2017).
1.2 Objectives and contributions
In this paper, we consider a DCmG regulated as in
(Tucci et al., 2017), and monitored as in (Gallo et al.,
2018). We introduce a distributed watermarking scheme
which allows for the detection of replay attacks in the
communication network. The main objectives that the
proposed watermarking technique fulfills are:
a. Enhance the monitoring scheme in (Gallo et al., 2018),
in order to detect replay attacks;
b. Be distributed, running attack detectors at each DGU
location and using the same communication network
required for secondary control in (Tucci et al., 2017);
c. Ensure the main goals of the primary and secondary
controllers, i.e. voltage regulation and current sharing,
respectively, are not compromised by watermarking;
d. Require a watermark which is not easily identifiable by
a resourceful attacker.
Objective (a) is motivated by the fact that the monitoring
scheme in (Gallo et al., 2018) is vulnerable to replay
attacks, as shown in Section 3. We also derive detectability
conditions, fundamental for the design of the watermark,
which must be fulfilled in order to guarantee detection.
This analysis will allow us to design a preliminary water-
mark which enables the detection of replay attacks.
1.3 Paper structure
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Sec-
tion 2 we introduce the model of the DCmG which is
considered. Section 3 is dedicated to the introduction of
the monitoring scheme in (Gallo et al., 2018), as well as
the definition of the replay attack, and the demonstration
that it is stealthy to the scheme in (Gallo et al., 2018).
In Section 4 we analyze the detectability properties of a
generic watermarking scheme, and propose a preliminary
watermark design. Some simulation results are shown in
Section 5, where the proposed watermark is shown to be
effective at detecting replay attacks. Finally, in Section 6,
we summarize the results, and define some future research
directions we believe to be of interest.
1.4 Notation
In the paper, the operator |·| applied to a set determines its
cardinality, while used with matrices or vectors it defines
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Fig. 1. Graph of DCmG. The blue lines represent the
power lines connecting the DGUs, and the red arrows
represent the communication graph.
their component-by-component absolute value. The oper-
ator ‖ · ‖ is used to define the matrix norm. In general,
in this paper inequalities are considered component-by-
component. The operators ⌈ · ⌉ and ⌊ · ⌋ define, respec-
tively, the ceiling and floor functions.
2. CHARACTERIZATION OF DC MICROGIRD
In the following, we consider a DCmG composed of N
distributed generation units interconnected by power lines.
Each DGU is modeled as in (Tucci et al., 2016), where
the interconnection power lines are taken to be purely
resistive. The DCmG modeled in this framework can
therefore be represented as an undirected graph, where
nodes represent the DGUs, edges denote power lines, and
edge weights are given by the conductance of the lines (see
Fig 1). DGUs are defined as the cascade of a DC voltage
source, a DC/DC converter, and a RLC filter connecting
it to other DGUs at a point of common coupling (PCC).
DGUs have local loads, represented as known currents
ILi. The dynamics of each DGU are characterized in state
space as follows:
x˙[i](t) = Aiix[i](t) +Biu[i](t) +Giα[i](t)
+Mid[i](t) + ξ[i](t) + w[i](t)
y[i](t) = Cix[i](t) + ρ[i](t)
, (1)
where x[i] = [Vi, Iti, v[i]]
⊤ is the state of the DGU, Vi is
the voltage at the PCC, Iti is the terminal current from
the converter, and v[i] is a scalar state needed to include
an integrator action in the primary loop. u[i] and α[i]
are respectively the primary and secondary input,where
the latter is defined in (3). Vector d[i] = [ILi, Vref,i]
⊤ is
an external known input to DGU i, where Vref,i is a
voltage reference for Vi. ξ[i] =
∑
j∈Ni
Aijx[j] is a vector
modeling the interconnection with other DGUs, where
Ni ⊂ N ≡ {1, · · · , N} is the set of the neighbors of
DGU i, i.e. the DGUs that are interconnected to DGU i
through power lines. Vectors w[i] and ρ[i] model unknown
state and measurement noises, respectively. We assume the
following:
Assumption 1. The unknown process noise w[i] and mea-
surement noise ρ[i] are bounded for all time:
|w[i](t)| ≤ w¯[i], |ρ[i](t)| ≤ ρ¯[i], ∀t, (2)
where w¯[i] and ρ¯[i] are known. △
The primary input u[i] = Vti = Kiy[i] is given by a decen-
tralized feedback controller (Tucci et al., 2016), where Ki
is a matrix designed according to (Tucci et al., 2016), and
guarantees voltage stability and reference tracking in the
whole DCmG. The secondary control input α[i] allows for
current to be shared among DGUs, and is the result of the
following consensus-based protocol:
α˙[i](t) = −
∑
j∈Ni
[0 kI 0]
(
y[i](t)
Isti
−
yc[j,i](t)
Istj
)
, (3)
where the scalars Isti > 0, ∀i ∈ N are design parameters
which allow the current to be shared among DGUs at
different rates. Scalar kI > 0 is the consensus weight,
common to all DGUs. Vector yc[j,i](t) represents the output
measurement which DGU j transmits to DGU i, as defined
in (4) below. The matrices in (1) are defined as in (Tucci
et al., 2016) and are summarized in the Appendix.
In order to operate the consensus-based secondary con-
troller described in (3), it is necessary to introduce a
communication network connecting different DGUs, as-
sumed to have the same topology as the DCmG. For ease
of analysis, in this preliminary paper, we introduce the
following assumption:
Assumption 2. The communication network is ideal, i.e.
information is exact and without time delays. Hence com-
municated data is:
yc[i,j](t) = y[i](t) , (4)
i.e. is equal to the measurement vectors. △
The introduction of a communication network exposes the
system to malicious attacks. In the following section we
describe how we model the attack strategy, and define the
type of attack motivating this work.
3. CYBER-ATTACKS AND MONITORING SCHEME
Our goal is to equip all DGUs with a monitoring scheme,
allowing to check whether the information received from
each neighbor is corrupted by an attack or not. In order to
formally introduce the attack in the communication value
yc[i,j](t), we redefine (4) as the following:
yc[i,j](t) = y[i](t) + βij(t− Ta)φi,j(t) (5)
where φi,j(·) is the attack function - designed by the
attacker according to its objectives and available resources
- and βij(t − Ta) is an activation function, which is 0 for
t < Ta, and 1 otherwise, where Ta is the time at which the
attack begins.
In order to detect the action of an attacker, a distributed
attack detection scheme based on multiple Unknown In-
put Observers (UIOs) has been introduced (Gallo et al.,
2018). This monitoring strategy is capable of detecting
whether the communication is subject to an attack, based
on limited knowledge of the neighbors’ dynamics, and on
information regarding the bounds on the disturbance in
Assumption 1. We will now briefly summarize the moni-
toring strategy in (Gallo et al., 2018).
3.1 Monitoring strategy
In the scheme proposed in (Gallo et al., 2018), we have in-
troduced a monitoring scheme based on UIOs, where each
DGU estimates the state of each of its neighbors. The error
between the estimate and the received measurements vec-
tor is then compared to a time-varying threshold, designed
based on the bounds on the noises defined in Assumption
1, to determine whether the communication network is
secure or not. In the remainder, we will present the es-
timation scheme in DGU i for the state of its neighbor
j. The UIO framework is used to reduce the information
transmitted between DGUs, as any communicated data
may be exposed to attacks.
In order to exploit the UIO estimator, we rewrite the
dynamics of DGU j as follows:
x˙[j](t) = AKjx[j](t) + E¯j d¯[j](t) + w˜[j](t)
y[j](t) = Cjx[j](t) + ρ[j](t)
(6)
where AKj = Ajj +BjKj, w˜[j](t) = w[j](t) +BjKjρ[j](t),
and E¯j d¯[j] represents the inputs to DGU j which are
unknown to the UIO in DGU i. Specifically, d¯[j]= Êj dˆ[j]
is a linear combination of the vector of variables:
dˆ[j] =
[
d⊤[j](t), α[j](t), x
⊤
[k1 ]
(t), . . . , x⊤[k|Nj |]
(t)
]⊤
,
while E¯ is full column rank and derived from matrices in
(1), and is defined in (Gallo et al., 2018) along with Êj .
The state of the UIO and estimate are (Chen et al., 1996):
z˙[j,i](t) = Fjz[j,i](t) + SjBu¯[j](t) + K̂jy
c
[j,i](t)
xˆ[j,i](t) = z[j,i](t) +Hjy
c
[j,i](t)
(7)
where the matrices are defined as in (Gallo et al., 2018),
and are such that Fj is Hurwitz stable, and SjE¯j = 0.
The residual is defined as r[j,i](t) = y
c
[j,i](t)− xˆ[j,i](t), and,
given stability of (7) and Assumption 1, is bounded, i.e.∣∣r[j,i](t)∣∣ ≤ r¯[j,i](t) (8)
holds for all t ≥ 0, where
r¯[j,i](t) = e¯[j,i](t) + ρ¯[j]. (9)
is the detection threshold. In (9) , e¯[j,i](t) is the time-
varying bound on the estimation error e[j,i](t) = x[j](t) −
xˆ[j,i](t), defined as:
e¯[j,i](t) = κe
−µt
[
e¯[j,i](0) + |Hj |ρ¯[j]
]
+ |Hj |ρ¯[j]
+
∫ t
0
κe−µ(t−τ)
[
|Sj |w¯[j] + |SjBjKj − K̂j |ρ¯[j]
]
dτ
(10)
where scalars κ, µ > 0 are such that ‖eFjt‖ ≤ κe−µt.
This bound, for suitably defined e¯[j,i](0), guarantees that
|e[j,i](t)| ≤ e¯[j,i](t), ∀t ≥ 0. Given these bounds on the
estimation error and residual, an attack is detected if (8),
used as a detection test, is not satisfied.
The detectability conditions of this scheme have been
studied in (Gallo et al., 2018). In the following section
we show that it may fail to detect replay attacks.
3.2 Replay attack
As anticipated in the introduction, we focus specifically on
the class of replay attacks, as even without any knowledge
of the system model and much computational resources,
they can be undetectable (Mo et al., 2015). In the scenario
we are considering, a malicious agent is able to eavesdrop
the communication link between DGU j and DGU i, from
some unknown time t = T0, and thus to start storing this
data in a memory buffer up to a time Ta > T0. At time
t = Ta, the attacker starts injecting the following attack
function into the communicated signal (5):
φ[j,i](t) = −y
c
[j,i](t) + y
c
[j,i](t− nT ), (11)
i.e. it replaces the current transmitted measurements of
the output of DGU j with past recorded measurements.
The integer n = ⌈(t− Ta)/T ⌉ represents the periodicity of
the signal the attacker injects, where T ≤ Ta − T0 is the
period of the repeated data, as decided by the attacker.
These attacks are particularly deceptive if data is recorded
when the state of the system is in a quasi stationary
re´gime. In Prop. 1, we give a preliminary result showing a
sufficient condition for the attack to be stealthy.
Proposition 1. (Stealthy Replay Attacks). If
|ea[j,i](Ta)| ≤ e¯[j,i](Ta) (12)
is satisfied, where ea[j,i](Ta) = x(Ta − T )− xˆ[j,i](Ta), then
inequality (8) holds for all t ∈ [Ta, Ta+T ), and the attack
will not be detected. 
Proof. Given time Ta and period of stored data T , for
t ≥ Ta, the residual r[j,i](t) = yˆ
c
[j,i](t)− xˆ[j,i](t) is
r[j,i](t) = e
a
[j,i](t) + ρ[j](t− nT ).
Note that ea[j,i](t) is the estimation error with the replay
attack. To find the value of ea[j,i](t), we analyze its dynam-
ics derived from (1) and (7). Hence, for t ∈ [Ta, Ta + T )
(i.e. n = 1), the dynamics of the estimation error under
attack are:
e˙a[j,i](t) = Fje
a
[j,i](t) + Sjw˜[j](t− T )− K˜jρ[j](t− T )
−Hj ρ˙[j](t− T ).
(13)
The solution to (13) is given by:
ea[j,i](t) = e
Fj(t−Ta)ea[j,i](Ta) +
∫ t
Ta
eFj(t−τ)
[
Sjw˜[j](τ − T )+
−K˜jρ[j](τ − T )−Hj ρ˙[j](τ − T )
]
dτ
(14)
which, by use of integration by parts, is:
ea[j,i](t) = e
Fj(t−Ta)
(
ea[j,i](Ta) +Hjρ[j](Ta − T )
)
+
−Hjρ[j](t− T ) +
∫ t
Ta
eFj(t−τ)
[
Sjw[j](τ − T )+
+(SjBjKj − K̂j)ρ[j](τ − T )
]
dτ,
(15)
where ea[j,i](Ta) = x[j](Ta−T )− xˆ[j,i](Ta) is the estimation
error at the start of the attack. Let us also note that the
upper bound on the estimation error e[j,i](t) is given as:
e¯[j,i](t) = κe
−µ(t−Ta)
[
e¯[j,i](Ta) + |Hj | ρ¯[j]
]
+ |Hj | ρ¯[j]
+
∫ t
Ta
κe−µ(t−τ)
[
|Sj| w¯[j] +
∣∣∣SjBjKj − Kˆj∣∣∣ ρ¯[j]] dτ.
(16)
We observe that all the terms in (15), apart from ea[j,i](Ta),
are bounded by the corresponding terms in (16). Hence,
it is sufficient that |ea[j,i](Ta)| ≤ e¯[j,i](Ta), where e¯[j,i](Ta)
is defined in (10), for the detection threshold (8) to not
be violated for all t ∈ [Ta, Ta + T ), thus proving the
Proposition. 
Remark 1. The objective of the malicious agent executing
a replay attack is to hide any change in operating condi-
tions in DGU j from DGU i, i.e. the changes caused by a
load change in DGU j or one of its neighbors. By doing
so, the attack is able to alter the equilibrium which is
reached through consensus, thus impeding current sharing,
or it may even be able to make it impossible to reach
consensus. On the other hand, it is clear to see that, as
long as steady state is maintained, it will not have any
effect on the network.
In the following we will present a detection strategy based
on watermarking to detect the presence of replay attacks
in the communication network.
4. CYBER-ATTACK DETECTION METHOD
To make a replay attack detectable, similar to the intuition
behind sensor watermarking (Ferrari and Teixeira, 2017),
we add a time varying signal ∆[i,j](t) to the measurements
communicated from DGU i to DGU j. For this preliminary
work the following is assumed to not bias the performance
of the consensus scheme (see objective (c) in Section 1.2):
Assumption 3. Watermark ∆[i,j](t) added to y[i,j](t) is
known exactly by both DGU i and DGU j for all t. △
4.1 Watermark signal
With the addition of the watermark, the communicated
measurement (4) becomes:
yc[i,j](t) = y[i](t) + ∆[i,j](t). (17)
Given Assumption 3, once yc[j,i](t) is received by DGU i,
the known watermark is subtracted, as to achieve exact
consensus it is necessary that the watermark be absent.
It is clear to see that the decoded information at DGU i,
yˆ[j,i], is the measurement of DGU j:
yˆc[j,i](t) = y
c
[j,i](t)−∆[j,i](t) = y[j](t),
which is then used in the dynamics of the secondary input
(3), as well as in the computation of the estimates (7) and
in the evaluation of the residual in inequality (8).
Analyzing the effect of the watermark on the UIO esti-
mators, it appears evident that under normal operating
conditions, the value of yˆc[j,i](t) will be the same as if the
watermark weren’t present. Hence, given analysis in (Gallo
et al., 2018), the residual r[j,i](t) = yˆ
c
[j,i](t) − xˆ[j,i](t) does
not exceed its bound, avoiding false alarms, as (8) always
holds. We now analyze the residual under replay attack.
4.2 Detectability analysis
For t ≥ Ta, as previously mentioned, the information
received by DGU i will be the buffered measurement
yc[j,i](t− nT ), and hence decoded data is:
yˆc[j,i](t) = y
c
[j,i](t− nT )−∆[j,i](t) =y[j,i](t− nT ) + δ[j,i](t)
(18)
where δ[j,i](t) is defined as
δ[j,i](t) := ∆[j,i](t− nT )−∆[j,i](t). (19)
We also redefine the state estimation error in the presence
of the watermark as ǫa[j,i](t) = x[j](t − T ) − xˆ[j,i](t), and
note that:
ǫa[j,i](Ta) = e
a
[j,i](Ta)−Hjδ[j,i](Ta), (20)
To verify detectability conditions of the replay attack, it
is necessary to analyze the residual under replay attacks,
which must then be compared with the detection threshold
r¯[j,i](t). Given time instance Ta and period of stored data
T , for t ≥ Ta residual r[j,i](t) = yˆ
c
[j,i](t)− xˆ[j,i](t) is:
r[j,i](t) = ǫ
a
[j,i](t) + ρ[j](t− nT ) + δ[j,i](t).
For the value of ǫa[j,i](t), we analyze its dynamics starting
from (1) and (7). In the first period over which the replay
attack is active, i.e. for t ∈ [Ta, Ta + T ), the dynamics of
the estimation error are:
ǫ˙a[j,i](t) = Fjǫ
a
[j,i](t) + Sjw˜[j](t)− K˜j
(
ρ[j](t) + δ[j,i](t)
)
+
−Hj
(
ρ˙[j](t) + δ˙[j,i](t)
)
.
(21)
The explicit solution of these dynamics are:
ǫa[j,i](t) = e
Fj(t−Ta)ǫa[j,i](Ta)+∫ t
Ta
eFj(t−τ)
[
Sjw˜[j](τ − T )− K˜j
(
ρ[j](τ − T ) + δ[j,i](τ)
)
−Hj
(
ρ˙[j](τ − T ) + δ˙[j,i](τ)
)]
dτ
(22)
which, by use of integration by parts and substituting in
equation (20), is:
ǫa[j,i](t) = e
Fj(t−Ta)
([
ea[j,i](Ta)−Hjδ[j,i](Ta)
]
+
+ Hjρ[j](Ta − T ) +Hjδ[j,i](Ta)
)
−Hj
(
ρ[j](t− T )+
+ δ[j,i](t)
)
+
∫ t
Ta
eFj(t−τ)
[
Sjw[j](τ − T )+
+ (SjBjKj − K̂j)ρ[j](τ − T )− K̂jδ[j,i](τ)
]
dτ.
(23)
We analyze the case presented in Prop. 1, where the attack
is stealthy in the absence of the watermark. It is possible
to formulate the following detectability condition:
Proposition 2. If, for some t = Td ≥ Ta, the inequality
∣∣∣∣Sjδ[j,i](t)− ∫ t
Ta
eFj(t−τ)
[
K̂jδ[j,i](τ)
]
dτ
∣∣∣∣ > 2r¯[j,i](t)
(24)
holds, then detection of the replay attack is guaranteed. 
Proof. To guarantee detection, it is necessary for (8) to
be violated, i.e. |r[j,i](t)| > r¯[j,i](t). Applying the triangle
inequality to the explicit solution of r[j,i](t) = ǫ
a
[j,i](t) +
ρ[j](t − nT ) + δ[j,i](t), and ǫ
a
[j,i](t) defined as in (23), we
have:
|r[j,i](t)| =
=
∣∣∣ǫa[j,i](t) + ρ[j](t− T ) + δ[j,i](t)∣∣∣+
+
∣∣∣eFj(t−Ta) (ea[j,i](Ta) +Hjρ[j](Ta − T ))+
−Hj
(
ρ[j](t− T ) + δ[j,i](t)
)
+
∫ t
Ta
eFj(t−τ)[
Sjw[j](τ − T ) + (SjBjKj − K̂j)ρ[j](τ − T )+
−K̂jδ[j,i](τ)
]
dτ + ρ[j](t− T ) + δ[j,i](t)
∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣∣Sjδ[j,i](t)− ∫ t
Ta
eFj(t−τ)
[
K̂jδ[j,i](τ)
]
dτ
∣∣∣∣+
−
∣∣∣eFj(t−Ta) (ea[j,i](Ta) +Hjρ[j](Ta − T ))+
+ Sjρ[j](t− T ) +
∫ t
Ta
eFj(t−τ)
[
Sjw[j](τ − T )+
+
(
SjBjKj − K̂j
)
ρ[j](τ − T )
]
dτ
∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣∣Sjδ[j,i](t)− ∫ t
Ta
eFj(t−τ)
[
K̂jδ[j,i](τ)
]
dτ
∣∣∣∣− r¯[j,i](t).
(25)
The last inequality derives from the bound on the distur-
bances, as well as from the hypothesis of Prop. 1, as can
be seen in (16). From (25) and (8) we obtain
|r[j,i](t)| ≥
≥
∣∣∣∣Sjδ[j,i](t)− ∫ t
Ta
eFj(t−τ)
[
K̂jδ[j,i](τ)
]
dτ
∣∣∣∣− r¯[j,i](t)
> r¯[j,i](t),
(26)
which is the attack detection condition. 
4.3 Watermark design
Now, we design a watermark signal ∆[j,i](t), that allows
the detection of a replay attack through (24), with the
additional aim of obstructing the attacker from identifying
the watermark from analysis of the communicated signal
(17). In qualitative terms, we note that these two objec-
tives conflict with each other, as the first would benefit
from large amplitude changes over time, which may, how-
ever, aid the identification of the watermark. Furthermore,
we notice that the watermark enters condition in (24)
through δ[j,i](t), rather than ∆[j,i](t) itself, thus making
it challenging to design a watermark satisfying (24) inde-
pendently of Ta and T , which are unknown to all but the
attacker. For the purpose of this work, we introduce the
following assumption, to simplify watermark design.
Assumption 4. The attack period is upper bounded by
some known quantity, i.e. T ≤ T¯ . △
To justify that this assumption is mild, we first note
that if the attacker records data while the DGUs are in
steady state, the attack to be stealthy to the considered
monitoring scheme following Prop. 1. We also stress that
we are considering a network of DGUs, whose steady state
is determined by the level of the load currents in all
subsystems. It is usually possible to define an upper bound
T¯ as the maximum period between load changes within the
Fig. 2. Voltage and current states from DGUs 1-4. Vertical
lines show initial time of attack on DGU 4 (red),
and detection of replay attack in communication with
DGU 2 and 3 (in blue and green, respectively).
DCmG, which can be evaluated empirically, or estimated
a priori.
Using this assumption, we then propose a sawtooth signal
of period 2T¯ as the watermark:
∆[j,i](t) = c[j,i](t− 2νT¯ ), (27)
where ν =
⌊
t/2T¯
⌋
, and c[j,i] is the slope. The period 2T¯
is selected to avoid having δ[j,i](t) = 0 for any T ∈ (0, T¯ ].
Indeed, with this choice of the watermark signal, δ[j,i](t)
will be a square wave of period 2T¯ .
In the following we show through simulation how it is
possible to tune the proposed watermark such that it
is difficult to identify by the attacker, while nonetheless
enabling detection of a replay attack which is stealthy for
the monitoring scheme proposed in (Gallo et al., 2018).
5. SIMULATION RESULTS
The proposed detection scheme with watermark is val-
idated through simulations in MATLAB. A DC micro-
grid consisting of 4 DGUs, interconnected as in Fig 1,
is considered, where the parameters and matrices for
DGUs and UIOs are taken as in (Gallo et al., 2018).
Process and measurement noises are drawn from uncorre-
lated uniform distributions satisfying Assumption 1, where
w¯[i] = [0.1, 0.1, 0.1]
⊤
and ρ¯[i] = [0.01, 0.01, 0.01]
⊤
. These
noises induce variations in the electrical signals compa-
rable to those seen in real microgrids, due to the converter
operations and measurement noises.
Before time t = 1s, all the DGUs are disconnected and
do not communicate. At time t = 1s, neighboring DGUs
connect to each other to create the microgrid topology
given in Fig 1. The current loads at the PCCs of DGUs
1, 2, and 3 are considered to periodically change from 6A
to 6.2A, 4A to 4.25A, and 3A to 3.15A, respectively, to
show the dynamic nature of loads in a microgrid. The
attacker chooses Ta = 9.2s to start replaying the data
it recorded starting at t = 7.4s, i.e. choosing attack period
T = T¯ =1.8s, so that the data is recorded in steady state.
Each DGU adds a watermark signal as in (27) to its
measurements communicated to its neighbors. Added wa-
termarks are the same for each communication link, i.e.,
c[i,j] = c[i,k] ∀i ∈ N , ∀j, k ∈ Ni, to prevent attacker from
identifying the watermark from the differences between
outgoing communication from the same DGU. The slopes
Fig. 3. Comparison of residuals and thresholds, in solid and
dotted lines, respectively, of monitors in DGU 4 with
watermarking. Data regarding estimation of state of
DGU 2 is presented in blue, while data referring to
DGU 3 is in red. Detection occurs as one component
of the residual exceeds its threshold (vertical lines).
Fig. 4. Comparison of residuals and thresholds of estima-
tors in DGU 4 without watermark (colors used as in
Fig. 3). As can be seen, the attack is not detected.
c[j,i] of the watermarks take constant values from 10
−3.2
to 10−3.5 for each DGU.
Voltages and currents of each DGU of the network are
shown in Fig. 2, whereas Fig. 3 shows the comparison
of the residuals of DGU 4’s estimates of its neighbors,
compared to their respective thresholds. It can be seen that
detection occurs for both communicated measurements,
although the effect of the replay attack on the DCmG is
not noticeable from Fig. 2. The relatively late detection
based on the residual of the UIO estimating the states of
DGU 3 is due to the smaller watermark slope c[3,i]. We
also show, Fig. 4, that if the watermark were not present,
the detection of the attack would not occur.
Enabling Detection: We now provide some insight regard-
ing the design of the watermark. Specifically, we note
that in (23), while w[j] and ρ[j] are multiplied by Sj and
(SjKjBj − K̂j), respectively, δ[j,i](t) is scaled by K̂j . This
is a design parameter of the UIO which, as seen in (Gallo
et al., 2018), can be made to have a larger absolute value
than the other scaling matrices. Therefore, even with c[j,i]
small, ∆[j,i](t) will have a large impact on r[j,i] when the
microgrid is subject to attack.
Identifiability of the watermark: We now focus on the
identifiability of the watermark by the attacker from
the communicated data. The methods which have been
considered possible to be used by the attacker are: by
inspection, via distribution and statistics, and through
Fig. 5. Comparison of the distributions of the communi-
cated output (in blue), actual output (in red), of the
voltage state of DGU 1 from t = 5s to t = 9s.
frequency spectrum analysis of communicated data. In
terms of identifiability by inspection, we note that yc[j,i] =
x[j] + ρ[j] + ∆[j,i], and that the maximum value of a
watermark signal over the whole microgrid, 2T¯10−3.2, is
less than a quarter of the bound on the measurement noise
of the corresponding DGU, and hence the discontinuity
occurring every period will be masked by noise.
Next, we show the distribution of the first component of
the communicated and actual outputs of DGU 1 in Fig. 5.
It is observed from this figure that the addition of the wa-
termark does not cause any significant changes to the dis-
tribution of the communicated measurements, compared
to the measurement output themselves.Furthermore, the
addition of watermark on the output signals changed the
mean of the measurements of all DGUs by at most 0.45%.
Moreover, differences in the variances of these signals were
below 3% of the original value for all DGUs. Therefore, the
watermark signal is difficult to identify from the distribu-
tion and the statistics of the communicated outputs.
Finally, if the watermark causes significant changes in
the frequency domain characteristics of the communicated
outputs, it may be possible for the attacker to identify it.
Hence, in Fig. 6 we compare the frequency domain of the
measurements of v[1] with and without the watermark,
by analyzing their fast Fourier transforms (FFTs) for
t ∈ [5s, 9s] (i.e. when the system is almost in steady state,
which is favorable for watermark detection), as well as
comparing them to that of the watermark itself. One can
see from this figure that the FFTs of the communicated
and actual outputs are very similar and that of the
watermark signal is incomparably small. As the watermark
is periodical, one would expect there to be a peak in the
spectrum at its frequency. In fact, f∆ =
1
2T¯
= 0.2778Hz,
and at this frequency there is a small peak. We note,
however, that, as the main frequency spectrum of the
measured and communicated outputs for the DGUs lies
at low frequencies, the peak caused by the watermark
is masked, as the spectral density of the communicated
signals are larger. Hence we stipulate that it is difficult
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Fig. 6. Comparison of FFTs of the communicated output
(in blue), actual output (in red), and the added
watermark (in green) of the integrator state of DGU
1 from t = 5s to t = 9s.
for the attacker to identify the watermark signal from a
spectral analysis of the communicated outputs.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we have presented a distributed watermarking
strategy to support a monitoring scheme used to vali-
date information transmitted between DGUs of a DCmG.
Analysis of the monitoring scheme under replay attack,
without the additive watermark, shows that as long as
data is recorded in steady state, the attack is undetectable.
We then introduce the watermark, and we derive a condi-
tion on the watermark to guarantee detection. Finally, we
propose a preliminary watermark signal design, showing
its effectiveness through simulation. As future work, we
plan to consider non-ideal communication networks, and
to propose a more refined watermarking signal.
Appendix A. DGU DYNAMICS
The voltage and current dynamics for DGU i are charac-
terised as follows:
dVi
dt
=
1
Cti
Iti +
∑
j∈Ni
1
CtiRij
(Vj − Vi)−
1
Cti
ILi
dIti
dt
=
1
Lti
Vti −
Rti
Lti
Iti −
1
Lti
Vi
, (A.1)
where (Vti, ILi) are inputs to the DGU, (Vi, Iti) are the
states, Vj ∈ Ni are the interconnection terms between the
DGUs. Rti, Cti, Lti are electrical parameters of the RLC
filter of DGU i. Rij is the resistance of the power line
connecting DGUs i and j. Matrices Aii, Bi, Mi, Aij , Ki,
and Ci in (1) are defined as (Tucci et al., 2016):
Aii =

−
∑
j∈Ni
1
RijCti
1
Cti
0
−
1
Lti
−
Rti
Lti
0
−1 0 0
 ,
Bi =
 01
Lti
0
 , Ki = [ ki,1 ki,2 ki,3 ] ,
Mi =
 − 1Cti 0
0 0
0 1
 , Aij =
 1RijCti 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
 , Ci = I,
where I is the identity, and Gi is the second column ofMi,
i.e. Gi = [0, 0, 1]
⊤.
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